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White Phosphorus Disposal  
   in the Gaza Strip 
by Kerei Ruru and Mark Alan Russell [ United Nations Mine Action in Gaza ]
White phosphorus disposal in a central demolition site is a difficult task when faced with storage limi-
tations, environmental and humanitarian issues, as well as a complex political and security situation. 
Despite these constraints, innovative and specialized demolition techniques were used in removing 
and destructing WP unexploded ordnance in the Gaza Strip over the period of March–May 2010 as 
this article describes. 
Between 27 December 2008, and 18 January 2009, the Israeli Armed Forces conducted Operation Cast Lead, a bombardment of the Gaza Strip by 
sea, air and land, leaving behind significant amounts 
of unexploded ordnance. In March 2010, the Unit-
ed Nations Mine Action Team reported that of 1,632 
assessed sites covering an area of 882,570 square me-
ters (1,056,545 square yards), 36 percent have a medi-
um to high risk of containing UXO. In February 2010, 
171 pieces of UXO were discovered, of which 60 were 
white phosphorus artillery rounds from Operation Cast 
Lead.1 Used for incendiary purposes, WP is a sponta-
neously flammable material, and can result in pain-
ful chemical-burn injuries which cause delayed wound 
healing.2 Once the political and logistical challenges in 
establishing a mine-action program within the Gaza 
Strip were overcome, the need to plan, facilitate and im-
plement WP-UXO disposal was immediate.
The UNMAT-Gaza Office, with support from imple-
menting partner MAG (Mines Advisory Group), was re-
sponsible for the planning, coordination and facilitation 
of establishing a central demolition site within Gaza. 
The site was designed to destroy the WP in a strictly 
controlled security situation that met the requirements 
of the Israeli Defense Forces and Hamas, the de facto au-
thority in Gaza. Conscious of the safety requirements 
regarding the possibility of civilian casualties resulting 
from wandering into the hazardous area, the UNMAT 
was restricted in terms of available, safe space within 
Gaza to facilitate WP-UXO explosive destruction. As a 
result of the WP residue on the surrounding environ-
ment and on the large water aquifers below the Gaza 
Strip, these environmental factors represented yet an-
other constraint on the project.
An innovative technique was developed, which dif-
fered from the open-pit demolition other countries gen-
erally use. Countless discussions, meetings, debates 
and workshops resulted in the development of what is 
now called the “cut and burn” technique. Essentially, an 
improvised, locally manufactured triangular-shaped 
charge packed with plastic explosives was used to cut 
open the WP UXO, exposing the WP content and al-
lowing the burning process to take place.
The main WP-UXO type found in Gaza was the 
M825 A1-155mm projectile filled with WP-impregnat-
ed felt wedges. The complete projectile weighs 46.72 
kilograms (102.8 pounds) and it contains 116 sponge 
wedges impregnated with a WP liquid weighing 5.78 kg. 
(12.72 lbs.). Metal spacers separate and divide the wedg-
es into four quadrants of 29 wedges each.
The wedges are not easily disposed of, due to the mass 
and density of the sponges. Furthermore, the wedges re-
quire a prolonged time to burn, causing the felt wedg-
es to cauterize. This prevents further burning and puts 
anyone who may pick up the cauterized sponge at risk. If 
handled, the wedges may break open, reigniting the WP 
with dangerous and harmful consequences.
UNMAT was not permitted to destroy the WP UXO 
in situ, which was an additional problem. However, most 
items were located in the rubble of destroyed buildings 
and areas where civilians were living in close proximity, 
and in some cases, on top of the destroyed buildings, so 
destroying the WP UXO in situ was not a viable option.
When found by the explosive-ordnance-disposal 
teams, the WP UXO were in varying deployment states. 
In cases of partial deployment, the UXO were either full 
rounds with canisters remaining inside the projectile 
body, canisters with no projectile body, canisters that 
had partially deployed from the projectile and were ei-
ther spilt or intact, or split canisters varying in length 
and size depending on how much burning, if any, had 
taken place.
Environmental Considerations
When destroying WP UXO, the main consideration 
was capturing the spread of the felt WP-impregnated 
sponges during demolition. This was achieved by uti-
lizing an old 40-foot-long (12.19 meters) shipping con-
tainer, cut in half along its length then buried at a depth 
of 1.5 meters (1.64 yards), flush with ground level. A 
300-millimeter-thick (11.81 inches) concrete layer was 
laid inside each half to provide a floor and prevent WP 
seepage through the container’s bottom. Below each 
munition’s position was an 8-millimeter (0.31-inch) 
mild steel plate pinned to the concrete to prevent the 
explosive plasma jet from destroying the concrete base.
The target WP UXO had to be positioned above the 
container’s base to facilitate cutting and control the 
spread of the felt sponges. Additional manual raking 
was conducted to ensure the complete burning of all re-
sidual WP sponges. Rails were tack welded at a height of 
500 millimeter (9.68 inches) from the base of the con-
crete so the targets could sit neatly with an air gap be-
tween the support rails. Once the charge detonated, the 
projectile would split open and fall between the support 
rails onto the container floor below.
To further reduce WP spreading, a spring-loaded, 
steel roof was constructed to contain the WP within the 
shipping container. The roof was designed to open mo-
mentarily and was strengthened with sandbags to help 
absorb the explosive shockwave, while reducing the 
number of WP sponges expelled. Chicken wire was po-
sitioned around the perimeter, between the roof and the 
container, to help reduce the spread of the WP sponges.
UXO Preparation for Disposal
Prior to the disposal of the WP UXO found in agri-
cultural areas or the rubble of destroyed homes, mate-
rials had to be stabilized in order to be safely moved to 
temporary storage facilities. Some WP UXO was safe to 
move without prior preparation, while other WP UXO 
was damaged or, in some cases, leaking, which pre-
sented a risk to the EOD team. The WP UXO was “leak 
sealed” before being moved to the demolition site. This 
process involved completely submerging any leaking 
WP UXO in large water-storage drums to cut off the 
oxygen supply and stop the WP from burning. The WP 
UXO (projectile or canisters) was then removed from 
the water bath, and the entire munition was immediate-
ly wrapped in Plaster of Paris bandages. Once the ban-
dages dried, this effectively sealed off any air supply to 
the WP and thereby made it safe to handle and trans-
port to the demolition site.
UNMAT-Gaza was responsible for coordinating the 
importation of plastic explosives into Gaza in coordina-
tion with the Israeli authorities and local authorities, to 
be used to destroy the WP UXO. This was completed 16 
times over the period March–May 2010 without incident 
or compromise to security.
Demolition Technique
Specially designed shaped charges were manufactured 
in Gaza to UNMAT specifications. The moulds were made 
locally to hold the plastic explosives to form the linear cut-
ting charges required. To conduct demolitions, UNMAT 
had limited detonating cord and on average, only two to 
A 155-mm WP shell split by explosives exposes the white phos-
phorus sponges (black sponges seen to rear of shell).
Photo courtesy of Mark Russell/UNMAT.
Six WP shells are prepared within demolition bins for demolitions 
with donor explosive charges attached.
Photo courtesy of Kerei Ruru/UNMAT.
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four electric detonators for 6–8 kilograms (13–18 pounds) 
of plastic explosives per day of demolitions. Once complet-
ed, the linear cutting charges were used to cut through the 
thick projectile casing, inner canister, metal right-angle 
separators, busters charge, delay detonator and the expul-
sion charge, allowing for the full destruction and burning 
of the WP sponges.
After conducting tests, the optimum standoff be-
tween the charge and the munition proved to be 42 mil-
limeters (1.65 inches) on a full projectile intact with 
canister. The amount of plastic explosives used varied 
during the initial testing period; the optimum amount 
was set at 1 kg. (2.2 lbs.) for a fully intact WP-UXO pro-
jectile. While a smaller amount of plastic explosives was 
used to slit open the projectile, it did not open the WP 
enough for it to spread and burn fully; therefore, pro-
jectiles occasionally required a secondary charge. On 
the other hand, a charge too large would cause a violent 
detonation and result in an unacceptable spread of WP 
sponges around the surrounding demolition site.
In instances where only the WP-UXO canisters with-
out the thick outer casings were disposed, reduced charg-
es were used in the metal linear cutting charge with no 
standoff. When part canisters and projectiles were en-
countered, a mixture of the large and small linear charg-
es, with and without standoffs, was incorporated.
Post-demolitions Procedures 
After the demolition was initiated, the WP demoli-
tions pit was not approached for 40 minutes after last 
smoke, ensuring that any dangers remaining from left-
over boosters, busters, etc., were no longer a threat to the 
EOD technicians responsible for the 
final manual confirmation and re-
sidual WP-clearance process. For 
the final clearance process, a two-
man team, wearing protective cloth-
ing and respirators, inspected the 
pits and separated scrap metal from 
any remaining WP sponges. This al-
lowed the remaining captured WP 
sponges to be broken up using long-
handled metal rakes. A 50-percent 
petrol and diesel mixture aided the 
final sponge-burning process, ensur-
ing complete WP consumption.
Summary
The specialized demolition tech-
niques and the construction of the 
tailor-made demolition range were 
developed to cater to the Gaza Strip’s 
unique environmental conditions 
while alleviating the concerns of the 
Israeli Defense Forces and Gaza's de 
facto authorities. Through this tech-
nique, UNMAT destroyed 92 WP-
UXO items in Gaza during 16 range 
days without incident, while ensur-
ing minimal environmental impact.
The successful WP-UXO de-
struction has contributed to civilian 
safety within the Gaza Strip while 
enhancing the safety and security 
of the wider humanitarian commu-
nity working inside Gaza. UNMAT 
would like to publicly acknowledge 
the Israeli Authorities, Gaza’s de fac-
to authorities and the donor com-
munity for providing UNMAT with 
the support and trust to facilitate this 
crucial life-saving program. 
see endnotes page 83
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WP canisters, post-demolition.
Photo courtesy of Kerei Ruru/UNMAT.
Leon Magnussen, MAG’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician, attaches an explosive shaped charge  
used to split 155-mm WP shells to expose WP.
Photo courtesy of Kerei Ruru/UNMAT.
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